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INTRODUCTION
The stated theme of this colloquium, but also its unstated central
paradox, is "the jurisprudence of mercy." This theme is paradoxical
because mercy has a jurisprudence only if it fits within some theory of
law or is rooted in some internal legal principle. Yet the most
fundamental question raised by any act of pardon or commutation is
precisely whether mercy is part of, or at least consistent with, justice.
Is mercy an act outside justice, in a separate realm? Or is it an act of
injustice?
This Essay first, in Part I, reviews the current state of the
jurisprudence of mercy; thus, it considers the varying definitions of
the nature of the act of mercy, as well as the widely disparate views of
legal scholars on the relationship between mercy and justice-i.e.,
whether mercy is consistent with, entailed by, or actually subversive
of justice. Parts II and III consider the especially complex link
between mercy and the morality, justice, and utility of the death
penalty, in older British law and in modern American constitutional
law respectively. Then, in Part IV, this Essay approaches these
important questions from an admittedly unusual perspective: it
redefines the nature of capital mercy in what may seem a
counterintuitive way-by endowing parties other than the executive
with the power to grant it. Furthermore, this Essay focuses most
intently upon how legal systems implicitly struggle with these
* Edwin E. Huddleson, Jr. Professor of Law, Stanford Law School. B.A., C.C.N.Y.; J.D.,
Stanford; Ph.D., Harvard.
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questions rather than explicitly answering them. Specifically, this
Essay takes an oblique look at the recent Illinois drama by focusing
not on the mass commutation itself as an act of mercy, but on the
Illinois Death Penalty Reform law that was passed almost a year after
the gubernatorial commutation.'
I. THE JUSTICE-MERCY CONUNDRUM
It will be useful to begin with two very general observations
about the way scholars have addressed these questions. First, some
scholars have usefully examined the act of pardon or commutation or
other form of remission of punishment by asking exactly what kind of
act it is in the first place. After all, to discern mercy's relation to
justice requires us to know what mercy actually does. What does an
act of mercy do? Technically, it can vacate a conviction, release a
person from prison, protect the convicted from collateral
consequences of conviction, or spare the condemned from death. But
what else does it do? Some have raised the idea that mercy is a way
to forgive.2 But they note the complexity of forgiveness, asking, for
example, whether it is the state or the victim who forgives, and how
forgiveness is meant to change the moral status of the offender and
the relationship between offender and victim.' Another interesting
notion is that mercy can function as an act of forgetting,4 as in amnesty
procedures; this conception of the act of mercy also raises very
troubling questions about mercy's consistency with justice, which
seems, intuitively, to require a good deal of remembering, indeed of
historically recording, since justice would seem to exist in relation to
acts known to have been done. Others have suggested that mercy is
relational in the sense that it acts to invite the criminal to do an act-
to seek atonement, for example, or that mercy itself is the act of
granting atonement.
This Essay suggests an additional possible form of verbal action
to mercy, possibly a counterintuitive one: mercy can be an act of
1. Capital Punishment Reform Study Committee Act, 2003 Ill. Legis. Serv. 93-605
(West).
2. See Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong To Commute Death Row? Retribution,
Atonement, and Mercy, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1319, 1337 (2004).
3. See, e.g., P.E. Digeser, Justice, Forgiveness, Mercy, and Forgetting: The Complex
Meaning of Executive Pardoning, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 161, 165-69 (2003) (questioning the
extent to which a pardon serves as forgiveness for the underlying offense); see also Daniel
Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (suggesting that "[m]ercy is
an act, whereas forgiveness is an attitude").
4. See Digeser, supra note 3, at 173-77.
5. See Garvey, supra note 2, passim.
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apology. Of course, we normally think of the apology as what the
criminal offers in hope of, or as a condition of, obtaining mercy. This
Essay proposes the opposite-the notion that in extending mercy, the
state, or the society for which it acts, itself apologizes to the criminal,
or, as is made clear below, to the set of citizens who by historical fact
or social category are most likely to have been condemned for the
crime in question.6 In doing so, the apologizing authority also in some
way confesses error.
A sub-variant of this "mercy as apology" phenomenon also
exists. In such cases, the legal authority offers not quite an apology,
but an apologia-that is, it will declare that it will not, or cannot,
remit the punishment, but the legal authority nevertheless confesses
the errors in its system of justice, or at least admits the appearance of
error, while justifying its refusal (or rationalizing its claimed inability)
to remit. Put differently, an apologia may be characterized as a
withheld act of apology and often a defensive, anxious rationalization
of a decision not to grant mercy.
The second general observation is that even before the
controversy over the Ryan commutation, mercy and its allied versions
of remission of punishment had recently become very lively topics in
American jurisprudence. Because mercy seems to be, in the abstract,
an undeniable virtue, the interesting question is always about what is
wrong with mercy, rather than when mercy might be justified or even
obligatory. Recent writings raise the question of whether mercy is
indeed inconsistent with justice or, more drastically, something of
which society even ought to be ashamed.7 Why the recent revival of
interest in mercy and its critique? One reason may be that legal
philosophy has seen of late a great revival of interest in clarifying the
principles of retributive justice,8 perhaps because, for the last
generation, the legal academy has been dominated by economic
utilitarianism of various forms.9 One part of this revival has been a
6. See infra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
7. See Markel, supra note 3, passim.
8. See generally Russell Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of "Just"
Punishment, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 843 (2003) (arguing that "retributivism is no better than
consequentialism as a theory of punishment"); David Dolinko, Retributivism,
Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHIL. 507 (1997)
(commenting on the "problematic nature of retributivism"); Douglas Husak, Holistic
Retributivism, 88 CAL. L. REV. 991 (2000) (arguing that the fundamentals of retributivism
are more holistic than individualistic); Daniel Markel, Are Shaming Punishments
Beautifully Retributive? Retributivism and the Implications for the Alternative Sanctions
Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) (writing with the hope of spurring "reconsideration
of what constitutes attractive punishment in a society such as ours").
9. The most cited legal scholar of the past half-century is the father of law and
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new critique of mercy, whereby scholars have questioned whether
mercy can be part of justice as defined in terms of one's preferred
theory of retributivism. 1° One writer in particular, Kathleen Dean
Moore, seems to have done the academy a great favor by attempting
to lay out in broad terms the criteria by which mercy can be
reconciled with, or be a part of, justice."1 Though her argument will
not be reviewed in this Essay, it should be noted that her line-drawing
has been boldly explicit and detailed, and therefore unavoidably
controversial, so as to provide a kind of foil for those not disposed to
see any comfortable relationship between mercy and justice.12
In that regard, a provocative new essay by Daniel Markel,
Against Mercy,13 takes on Moore specifically and the claims of a
mercy-justice link more generally. As his title would suggest, Markel
argues forcefully that mercy, as conventionally defined, is in fact a
very bad thing for justice.14 Mercy, according to Markel, dangerously
releases offenders from moral accountability and violates our most
central notions of equality; moreover, what he worriedly calls the
"legalization of mercy" undermines democratic government. 15
Markel attacks those such as Moore who, he believes, blur the
mercy/justice line by wrongly adumbrating certain factors-such as
the offender's belief that she acted in justified civil disobedience-
under the criteria of just punishment. 6 Markel argues that the legal
system must be careful in distinguishing equitable defenses to legal
culpability from truly arbitrary irrelevant factors; therefore, he places
a number of morally tempting factors (e.g., a prisoner's age or
infirmity as it bears on the subjective experience of punishment, the
suffering of an inmate's family) on the non-justice side of the line
because they play no rational role in his understanding of
economics, Richard Posner, who has been cited almost twice as often as the runner-up.
See Fred R. Shapiro, Interpreting Legal Citations, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424 (2000).
10. See Markel, supra note 3, passim.
11. See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 131-81 (1989) [hereinafter MOORE, PARDONS]; Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardon
for Good and Sufficient Reasons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 281, 286-88 (1993). For one
excellent critique of Moore along these lines, see Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the
President's Pardon Power, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 143,143-50 (2003).
12. See, e.g., MOORE, PARDONS, supra note 11, at 138-41, 144-46 (arguing that
pardons are appropriate for cases of "reduced ability offenders" or unsuccessful attempts
or "repaired" crimes).
13. Markel, supra note 3.
14. Id. at 5.
15. Id. at 27.
16. Id. at 6.
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retribution.17
Another reason why mercy-critique has become more common
has been the advent of an emerging jurisprudence of restorative
justice. Restorative justice refers to the wide array of purportedly
non-adversarial, reconciliation-aimed schemes of resolution that, in
many parts of the world, have strikingly encroached on the making of
formal criminal justice systems. This is too broad a subject to tackle
here, though a recent symposium offers a wonderfully comprehensive
look at the movement. 18 But the promotion of restorative justice has
prompted criticisms of its premises. 9 Because mercy may be a
potential or implicit component of some of the principles of
restorative justice, these criticisms parallel the attack on the mercy-
justice link. An example is contained in a new book by Professor
Annalise Acorn,2 ° who lays out the link between mercy and
restorative justice as follows: "Restorative justice... rejects the idea
that mercy is a corrective to the excesses of hard-hearted justice.
Rather, justice itself is defined in terms of an active extension of
mercy to, and between, victim, offender, and community, each
helping the others through the process of making things right again."'"
Acorn goes on to elaborate on what she takes to be the
predicates of the movement's attempt to align mercy and compassion
with justice:
The restorative justice critique of punishment as justice...
argument is grounded in a theory of the desirable and, more
precisely, the truly desired. Punishment of the offender is not
what the victim really wants. The victims' authentic longings
for justice are better understood in terms of their desire for the
experience of affirmation of their worth and secure
membership in the community. What victims really want is for
the offender to own responsibility for the harm, to shift his or
her attitude from disrespect to respect for the victim and the
norms of the community, and to feel and express genuine
17. Id. at 31.
18. Eric Luna, Introduction: The Utah Restorative Justice Conference, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 1 (examining restorative justice in light of the United States' contemporary problems
with crime and punishment). For a superb overview of the issues, see generally Erik Luna,
Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Consequences of Restorative Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 205,227-302 (2003).
19. See, e.g., Douglas Sylvester, Myth in Restorative Justice History, 2003 UTAH L.
REV. 471, 493-522 (remarking on the historical underpinnings of restorative justice). See
generally Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Dangers of Community, 2003 UTAH
L. REV. 343 (commenting on the "danger" the restorative justice movement faces).
20. ANNALISE ACORN, COMPULSORY COMPASSION (2004).
21. Id. at 48.
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shame, remorse, and contrition. Victims want the shared
feeling of letting go of the loss and sadness of the past harm
through forgiveness and healing. They want the public
vindication that is achieved through caring and authoritative
acknowledgment of their suffering. Punishment does not
deliver any of these outcomes. It is a mere token: an external
fact that does not and cannot fulfill our internal longings for
experiential justice.22
Acorn's attack on restorative justice is a complex one, but her
concluding summary bears strongly, if implicitly, on the role of mercy.
Her argument is that the expression of mercy and reconciliation may
have far more to do with the psychological needs of the mercy-
granting authority than with the reform of the offender or the health
of the society:
Restorative justice, then, is a ritual that we purposefully create
with a view to eliciting a performance of the offender's
compassion and remorse. We know that his remorse will make
us uncomfortable and embarrassed, that we will want to put a
stop to this - our own vicarious discomfort - and that the only
way to do so will be by restoring the offender to pride of
place.... The momentum of the restorative encounter thus
takes advantage of the good nature of the victim and
community, riding on the strange but compelling power of that
combined discomfort and euphoria we feel over the sinner who
repents.23
At a general level, this Essay seeks to somewhat reframe the
critique of mercy's relation to justice. The scholarship noted above is
sharply normative in its insistence in opposing mercy to justice. But
one can also make a historically or philosophically descriptive or
22. Id. at 49.
23. Id. at 160. Acorn's view of restorative justice is even more bitingly negative than
that, extending her psychological criticism of it to alarming contemporary trends:
But I have come to the conclusion that the vision restorative justice offers us is
not a vision of perfection or even of anything genuinely desirable. The sensibility
of restorative justice is drawn from a whitewashing culture informed by new-age
thinking ("I love and affirm everything in the universe"), self-help ("what I hear
you saying is..."), pop psychology's mantra that "revealing is healing," and a
soft religion that, instead of seeing punishment as an integral part of processes of
repentance and forgiveness, sees repentance and forgiveness as a substitute for
punishment. Its sensibility is drawn from a culture that not only tells us that
everything, including justice, is a matter of expressing and validating our own and
other's feelings, but also feeds us canned, synthetic lines for doing both. The so-
called magic of the restorative ritual requires us to buy into these ersatz pieties.
Id. at 136.
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analytic critique. That is, it is possible to study a legal system by
observing how it agonizes over the relationship of justice to mercy, or
how it consciously or unconsciously rationalizes the relationship
between the two, or how it exploits the inherent tension between
them for instrumental purposes. This is largely this Essay's approach
to the death penalty. In fact, it is this Essay's goal to rework the
recent history of American capital punishment law into a narrative of
neurotic, conflicted, erratic, and incomplete acts of mercy aimed at
reconciling American law with confessed errors in our history that no
law can readily cure.
II. THE PECULIAR MERCY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW
Now, to turn to Governor Ryan and the death penalty itself. The
commutation of a death sentence has always been the most dramatic
motivator to scholars considering the role of mercy in our legal
system, and often leads to inquiries into the nature of mercy and the
full remission of punishment for crime in general. 4 My main goal
here is to offer two particular angles on the Ryan commutation, one
that in a sense narrows its significance and one that slightly broadens
it.
First, I suggest that not only is the commutation of a death
sentence the most dramatic example of an act of mercy, but also that
the Ryan commutation needs to be understood in the context of the
particular dynamics of modern death penalty law in the United
States. Second, though we naturally view acts of legal mercy as tied
to the pardoning power of the executive, we should look at mercy
more broadly in terms of government powers. More specifically,
other branches of government can exercise mercy or can be induced
by the executive to give mercy. Thus, judges and juries can spare a
capital defendant's life, even in the face of the facts and the law of
capital sentencing, and leave the State no appeal .2 Thus, this Essay
poses the following: the American legal/political system has a very
guilty conscience about the death penalty. It has, at several points,
granted a kind of systemic pardon, one which this Essay will
recharacterize as an apology or confession of error, but also
sometimes an apologia. Moreover, the judicial and legislative
24. See generally Symposium, Clemency and Pardons, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 177 (1993)
(gathering essays on clemency occasioned by statements about anti-death penalty stand of
former New Mexico Governor Tony Anaya); Statement of Tony Anaya on Capital
Punishment, id. at 177-83.
25. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 441-46 (1981) (double jeopardy bars any
review or retrial of penalty phase "acquittal" of death).
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branches have played significant, perhaps predominant, roles in
granting clemency.
A useful prelude to the story of the modern American death
penalty, is a reminder of a three-decade-old examination of a
centuries-old episode in the merciful remission of the death penalty.
This examination is a key text in the critical leftist jurisprudence of
Great Britain a generation ago, a movement closely tied to, and
perhaps underlying, the modern American Critical Legal studies
movement.26 Perhaps the central work of that British jurisprudence
was Douglas Hay's Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law.27
Hay's essay depicts the peculiar paradox of criminal justice in late
eighteenth century England. The British legal landscape of the time
included horrifyingly draconian criminal laws that often imposed the
death penalty as punishment for property crimes, confounded by a
complex and mysterious system whereby judges of various levels
could issue pardons, and whereby perhaps half of all death sentences
were revoked by some discretionary decree. 28 The pardons were
sometimes acts of equitable discretion on the part of judges
responding to the facts of the cases, but just as often, the pardons
came on the petition of the propertied.29 Indeed, petitioning for a
pardon of the criminal was often the chief way that a landholder
could signal his social prestige.3 Hay explains how these gentlemen,
far more concerned about crimes of disloyalty from their
subordinates than from the threats of external robbers or burglars,
discovered that control through selective mercy was a much more
powerful tool of ensuring their socioeconomic authority than
categorical invocation of statutory punishments.
31
Hay speculates that what worked for the landholder was really
what worked for British society as a whole: at a time of widespread
crime, but when the statutes themselves, if fully enforced, would lead
to legalized massacres of working people or, conversely, widespread
nullification and rebellion, the most effective way for social superiors
to retain psychological and moral authority was to induce criminals to
(literally) beg for their lives and then exploit the magisterial image of
26. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987).
27. See DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION'S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 17-63 (1975).
28. Id. at 43.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 47.
31. See id. at 40-49.
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discretionary mercy they gained from frequent commutations.32
Mercy in Hay's description was a hideous act of cruelty especially
because it was an act lying within the inherent moral or political
discretion of a lawmaker, yet not itself required by any rule of law.
33
Mercy functioned as a form of torture because it could be denied, and
even if it was ultimately granted, the temporary withholding of it was
a sadistic way of exacerbating a person's fear of death and reminding
him that his fate lay within the judgment (or whim) of someone else. 
34
Nonetheless, the act of mercy was an important legal ritual, the
ultimate demonstration of the law's imperial majesty. What Hay calls
"the prerogative of mercy"35 was a way of sustaining the law's
appearance of magisterial fairness while masking the corrupt
discretion and cynical political manipulation by which it really
operated.36
As Hay describes the awesome paradox of the law's power:
"The judge might.., emulate the priest in his role of human agent,
helpless but submissive before the demands of his deity. But the
judge could play the role of deity as well, both the god of wrath and
the merciful arbiter of men's fates.
37
Thus, as Hay notes, legal power is most insidious when
embedded in private power. "Where authority is embodied in direct
personal relationships, men will often accept power, even enormous,
despotic power, when it comes from the 'good King,' the father of his
people, who tempers justice with mercy.
38
Pardons, Hay explains, were presented as "acts of grace rather
than as favours to interests,' 39 and as Hay describes "the peculiar
genius of the law":
It allowed the rulers of England to make the courts a selective
instrument of class justice, yet simultaneously to proclaim the
32. Many prosecutors even required the pardoned man to sign a letter of apology and
gratitude, which was printed in the county newspaper. Id. at 42.
33. Id. at 42.
34. As Hay notes, our modern concept of a rationalized, abstract bureaucracy of
justice would have been unfamiliar to individuals living during this era, which thought of
justice more in personal, relational terms. Id. at 39.
35. Id. at 40.
36. Id. at 44-45 (explaining that pardons were more likely when the petitioner could
exploit his or the condemned person's family connections).
37. Id. at 29.
38. Id. at 39. Hay notes that mercy served to save those criminals who themselves had
wealth or status, and also as a tool to manage patronage where a criminal was a useful
subordinate. But most dramatically, for Hay, it was a tool of ideological oppression. Id. at
46-47.
39. Id. at 47.
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law's incorruptible impartiality, and absolute determinacy....
Discretion allowed a prosecutor to terrorize the petty thief and
then command his gratitude, or at least the approval of his
neighborhood as a man of compassion. It allowed the class that
passed one of the bloodiest penal codes in Europe to
congratulate itself on its humanity.
4°
Hay's thesis that the merciful pardon was a devious device for
political legitimation as a means of class control has proved
controversial.41 Moreover, presumably not even Hay would extend
his thesis to the very different setting of the death penalty in modern
America. Nevertheless, his essay serves as a useful prelude to
examining the modern history of American capital mercy because it
illustrates how we can look to the merciful pardon as a component of
the overall hydraulics of a legal system. Moreover, if we accept Hay's
thesis that the merciful pardon worked quite effectively in Britain, his
essay is especially useful in setting up the contrast to modern
America, where capital mercy has not been the result of any such
master-manipulation, but rather is evidence of the fits and starts of a
dysfunctional system that has attempted to establish the legitimacy of
a capital punishment system by alternating execution and mercy.
III. THE MODERN CYCLE OF LAW, REMISSION, AND APOLOGY
In a sense, the modern history of the American death penalty
begins with an awkward expression of moral reluctance-somewhere
between an apology and apologia. And for what was there to
apologize? By the late 1950s the death penalty had come under
attack on several broad grounds.42 It was denounced as a cruelly
capricious lottery, revealing no rational pattern by which unguided
juries distinguished the death-deserving from the life-deserving;4 3
there was emerging doubt whether it had any demonstrable marginal
deterrent effect on murder as compared to life imprisonment;44 and,
most dramatically for American history, it was an instrument of racial
bias, a bitter legacy of slavery"5 whether the bias was intentional or
40. Id. at 48-49.
41. See John H. Langbein, Albion's Fatal Flaws, 98 PAST & PRESENT 96-120 (1998)
(arguing that Hay's theory of legitimation is circular and non-falsifiable).
42. See JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL
EVOLUTION 87-95 (1983).
43. See SAMUEL R. GROSS & ROBERT MAURO, DEATH & DISCRIMINATION 5
(1989).
44. Rudolph Gerber, Death is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 350 (1998)
(reviewing studies and finding no reliable support for a deterrent effect).
45. GROSS & MAURO, supra note 43, at 5-6.
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negligently implemented, and whether it was measurable in terms of
the race of offenders or the race of victims.46 Ironically, the issue that
has become most salient now, the risk of executing the absolutely
innocent, was probably far less important to the public and legal
community at that time.
Surely most American legislatures wanted to continue the death
penalty as it had existed as late as the 1960s.47 But as the death
penalty came under attack for its arbitrary and racially biased
implementation in the 1950s, the key legal achievement that made it
possible for the death penalty to survive ultimate legal challenge was
the Model Penal Code's ("MPC") reconception of how a death
penalty law might be fair. The drafters commissioned by the
American Law Institute ("ALI") would have preferred no death
penalty at all-such was their progressive, optimistic faith in the
ability of modern penology to exploit the discoveries of social science
and to use the tools of rehabilitation, incapacitation, and deterrence
to provide the optimal remedies for crime.48 The key drafter, Herbert
Wechsler, had expressed these views earlier in what was the
philosophical rationale for the MPC's homicide rules:
If the death penalty is commonly regarded with greater dread
than even life imprisonment, as we usually think it is; if criminal
homicides are disturbingly frequent; if the attempt to apply the
death penalty will not lead to nullification; and if it can be
applied without exciting too much public hysteria, without
brutalizing the population and without destroying too many
lives, then there is a strong case for employing it in the most
aggravated cases for deterrent purposes.... But if these
conditions do not exist ... it would seem at least to experiment
with a less severe penalty than death.4 9
And then in the MPC commentary itself, the drafters exhibited a
quaint moral delicacy in acknowledging that they were repelled by
what they saw as the vulgarity of the death penalty and its potential to
46. See generally Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 305
(examining the major death penalty case decisions handed down by the Supreme Court in
late 1982, as well as the Supreme Court's prior capital punishment doctrine).
47. Id. at 363-67 (describing old "unguided" discretion statutes).
48. The ALI report is published as THORSTEN SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY: A
REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
(1959). For a discussion of the origins of the modern death penalty in the Model Penal
Code, see Robert Weisberg, The New York Statute as Cultural Document: Seeking the
Morally Optimal Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 283, 288-92 (1996).
49. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide 11, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 1261, 1306-07 (1937).
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cause social disruption:
Apart from the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent, its
possible imposition has a discernible and baneful effect on the
administration of criminal justice. A trial where life is at stake
becomes inevitably a morbid and sensational affair, fraught
with risk that public sympathy will be aroused for the defendant
without reference to guilt or innocence of the crime charged."
Indeed, they acknowledged that whatever the political or legal
necessity of jury sentencing in capital cases, they would have
preferred pure bench trials at the penalty phase because these would
be "less emotional or prejudiced."51
Yet the drafters knew that their commission from the ALI was to
write a reformist code that had some reasonable chance of
widespread adoption across the states and that the MPC therefore
had to accommodate many of the consensus legal norms. Given these
realities, they created the basic structure of the guided discretion
statute, with the balancing of specified aggravating and mitigating
factors, that ultimately won approval from the Unites States Supreme
Court.1
2
Whether the states would be required to accept the MPC model
remained uncertain for years. In 1971, the Supreme Court refused to
strike down the old unguided discretion statutes under the Due
Process Clause, with Justice Harlan uttering his famous admonition
against further challenges to the death penalty on what he considered
the quixotic ground that they failed to conquer the twin problems of
caprice and racial bias:
Those who have come to grips with the hard task of actually
attempting to draft means of channeling capital sentencing
discretion have confirmed the lesson taught by the history
recounted above. To identify before the fact those
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators
which call for the death penalty, and to express these
characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and
applied by the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which
are beyond present human ability.... For a court to attempt to
catalog the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit
rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of
50. SELLIN, supra note 48, at 79-80.
51. Id. at 73.
52. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 191-95 (1976) (plurality opinion).
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circumstances would ever be really complete.53
If Furman v. Georgia,54 the very next year, was an apology, and
McGautha v. California55 became the core text of our legal system's
apologia-an acknowledgment of the imperfection of justice but, at
the same time, a tragically resigned refusal to grant mercy because to
do so would be to gratuitously confess error when in fact the legal
regime of the death penalty could not be perfected in such a way that
the failure to do so could require a confession of error. Thus,
McGautha was not a confession of error so much as an admission of
inevitable imperfectability.
In any event, the Supreme Court's suspension of the death
penalty in the 1972 Furman decision constitutes an act of apology and
pardon. Of course, some might insist on definitionally excluding a
judicial decision, at least a decision rendered on a legal question, from
the category of extra-jurisprudential mercy. But Furman invalidated
the entire death penalty structure of the United States in one gesture
and, in so doing, permanently released hundreds from death row.
Moreover, it did so in an implicit holding that confessed nothing so
simple as legal error at trial, but rather, the moral failure of the whole
history of capital punishment in the United States. 6 Furman itself
was preceded, though not necessarily motivated by, gubernatorial
pardons of death sentences in the late 1960s, at a time when the civil
rights movement had shamed the United States over the random but,
more importantly, racially imbalanced administration of the death
penalty. Thus, I suggest viewing the decision as a parallel to those
gubernatorial pardons, or indeed as harmonizing them into a national
act of amnesty. Indeed, Furman is the second of two major apologies
for historical racism in the modern Supreme Court-the other, of
course, being the singular Warren opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education.8
Furman's suite of opinions-with all nine Justices opining-can
hardly be reduced to a single principle. The concurring Justices'
opinions are, on their face, mostly lengthy historical and philosophical
53. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204, 208 (1971).
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
55. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
56. See Weisberg, supra note 46, at 316.
57. See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 210, 235-36 (clemency bars executions in California and New
York).
58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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disquisitions about the meaning of "cruel and unusual punishment,"59
technical analyses of Eighth Amendment precedent, 60 adversions to
scientific examinations of the social utility of the death penalty, 61 and
debates over the criteria by which a societal moral consensus can be
established.6' But we know that the decision was substantially
animated by the moral and historical embarrassment deliberately
provoked by petitioners' briefs and by the civil rights movement's
wider attack on the death penalty.63 Consequently, some of the
opinions themselves employ the language of apology and confession
of error.64 In perhaps the most famous passage from the case, Justice
Potter Stewart confessed:
These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all
the people convicted of rapes and murders in 1967 and 1968,
many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence
of death has in fact been imposed.65
Justice William 0. Douglas made sure to specifically apologize
for the racist history of the death penalty, quoting the President's
Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice:
"Finally there is evidence that the imposition of the death sentence
and the exercise of dispensing power by the courts and the executive
follow discriminatory patterns. The death sentence is
disproportionately imposed and carried out on the poor, the Negro,
and the members of unpopular groups. "66
Justice Douglas cited a study of capital cases in Texas from 1924
to 1968 that established that:
Application of the death penalty is unequal: most of those
59. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242-45 (Douglas, J., concurring) (tracing the meaning of the
clause to British history).
60. E.g., id. at 264-86 (Brennan, J., concurring) (examining over a century of cases).
61. E.g., id. at 348-53 (Marshall, J., concurring) (citing statistical studies on
deterrence).
62. E.g., id. at 361-71 (Marshall, J., concurring) (questioning the value of opinion
polls where much of the public is uninformed).
63. GORECKI, supra note 42, at 87-95.
64. E.g., Furman, 408 U.S at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring) (lamenting that laws
leaving judges and juries unguided discretion have fed prejudice against the poor and
powerless).
65. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
66. See id. at 249-51 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, 143 (1967)).
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executed were poor, young, and ignorant.
Seventy-five of the 460 cases involved codefendants, who,
under Texas law, were given separate trials. In several
instances where a white and a Negro were co-defendants, the
white was sentenced to life imprisonment or a term of years,
and the Negro was given the death penalty.
Another ethnic disparity is found in the type of sentence
imposed for rape. The Negro convicted of rape is far more
likely to get the death penalty than a term sentence, whereas
whites and Latins are far more likely to get a term sentence
than the death penalty.67
And quoting the warden of New York State's Ossining
Penitentiary, the notorious "Sing Sing":
Not only does capital punishment fail in its justification, but no
punishment could be invented with so many inherent defects.
It is an unequal punishment in the way it is applied to the rich
and to the poor. The defendant of wealth and position never
goes to the electric chair or to the gallows.68
In 1976, in Gregg v. Georgia69 and companion cases, the Supreme
Court returned to the problems identified four years earlier in
Furman, but now held that the post-Furman "guided discretion"
statutes, employing separate penalty phase with the statutory criteria
of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, adequately solved the
constitutional problem. 70 The Court in effect revoked the remission
of death sentences when, in Gregg, it approved the new guided
discretion statutes. 71  But the cautious language of the plurality
opinion in Gregg is significantly ambiguous.72 It holds that statutes
like Georgia's, rooted in the MPC structure, seem well-designed to
67. See id. at 250 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Rupert Koeninger, Capital
Punishment in Texas, 1924-1968, 15 CRIME & DELIN. 132, 141 (1969)).
68. LEwIS E. LAWES, LIFE AND DEATH IN SING SING 155-60 (1928), quoted in
Furman, 408 U.S. at 251 (Douglas, J., concurring).
69. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
70. See id. at 206-07; see also Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 335-36 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (striking down statutes that purported to solving the Furman problems
by eliminating all jury discretion and imposing mandatory death penalty for certain
murders); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976) (approving law similar to Georgia's);
Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 259-60 (1976) (same).
71. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 153 passim.
72. See id. at 187-206 (plurality opinion) (holding that new guided discretionary
statutes facially cure problems of old laws, but leaving open whether future empirical
review is required).
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cure the problems diagnosed by Furman, to provide the proper
balance between rationality and discretion, and to require sufficient
indicia of extreme moral desert to avoid racial bias.73  But, in so
doing, did the Court approve these statutes conditionally or
unconditionally? Did it categorically withdraw its remission, start
history over again, and declare that from now on any death sentence
consistent with its opinion would be constitutionally legitimate? Or
did it, perhaps in the spirit of the original MPC drafters themselves,
conditionally proffer the new statutes as having the potential to solve
the constitutional problem, with the proof of their success remaining
to be seen? Was the apology withdrawn entirely, or did it morph into
a kind of conditional apologia?
In the decade that followed Gregg, of course, the Court tinkered
with the constitutional nuances of the new statutes,7 4 claiming to fine-
tune its balance between rationality and discretion,75 though some
would say it simply exacerbated its original failure to find the magic
solution to the conflict between them.76 In one telling instance of this
effort at fine-tuning, the Court had to face fairly explicitly the notion
of "mercy" in the proper administration of capital punishment. In
California v. Brown,77 a penalty-phase jury in California was
instructed not to be swayed by "mere sentiment, conjecture,
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.
78
Cautiously finessing the determinacy/discretion line, the defendant
did not argue that passion or public feeling should play any role in the
jury's sentencing determination. Instead, he argued that as likely
construed by the jury, the challenged instruction told the jurors not to
be swayed by "sympathy. '79 The Court rejected this constitutional
challenge:
By concentrating on the noun "sympathy," respondent ignores
the crucial fact that the jury was instructed to avoid basing its
decision on mere sympathy. Even a juror who insisted on
focusing on this one phrase in the instruction would likely
73. See id. at 206-07.
74. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978) (holding that a capital
defendant must be free to offer all relevant mitigating circumstances).
75. Id. at 604-05.
76. See, e.g., id. at 629 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that "the Court has gone
from pillar to post, with the result that the sort of reasonable predictability upon which
legislatures, trial courts, and appellate courts must of necessity rely has been all but
completely sacrificed").
77. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
78. Id. at 539.
79. Id. at 540.
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interpret the phrase as an admonition to ignore emotional
responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating
evidence introduced during the penalty phase.... We think a
reasonable juror would... understand the instruction not to
rely on "mere sympathy" as a directive to ignore only the sort
of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence
adduced during the penalty phase.80
The Court concluded that the instruction indeed "serves the useful
purpose of confining the jury's imposition of the death sentence by
cautioning it against reliance on extraneous emotional factors, which,
we think, would be far more likely to turn the jury against a capital
defendant than for him.
81
Moving to the end of the Supreme Court's role in the story, the
great reckoning occurred in McCleskey v. Kemp,' where one distinct
flaw in our capital system, acknowledged indirectly in Furman and
glossed over in Gregg, was squarely presented to the Court: new,
highly refined statistical evidence that even under the new guided
discretion statutes, death sentences were handed down in drastically
disproportionate numbers to defendants who killed white victims. 3
The Court might well have rejected McCleskey's claims on the
available narrow ground, cited by the Eleventh Circuit, that the
statistics remained less than fully convincing.' But though the
outcome met the predictions, its basis did not. Justice Powell's
majority opinion famously conceded the salience of the statistics, 85
startlingly accepted their logical implications, but refused to accept
their arguably legal consequences.86
Justice Powell's opinion combined the two kinds of expression
we saw earlier-apology and apologia. Rather than finesse the issue
of racial discrimination, Powell invoked the apologia language of
Justice Harlan, but with a distinctly greater emphasis on apology-
i.e., he confessed that there is inherent racial bias in the death
penalty.
McClesky's claim, taken to its logical conclusion, throws into
80. Id. at 542.
81. Id. at 543.
82. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
83. Id. at 286-87.
84. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 753 F.2d 877, 892-99 (11th Cir. 1985).
85. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 312-13 (accepting evidence of "a discrepancy that
appears to correlate with race").
86. See id. at 315 (explaining that accepting such a claim would condemn the whole
criminal justice system).
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serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal
justice system. The Eighth Amendment is not limited in
application to capital punishment; but applies to all penalties.
Thus, if we accepted McCleskey's claim that racial bias has
impermissibly tainted the capital sentencing decision, we could
soon be faced with similar claims as to other types of penalties.
Moreover, the claim that his sentence rests on the irrelevant
factor of race could easily be extended to apply to claims based
on unexplained discrepancies that correlate to membership in
other minority groups, and even to gender. Similarly, since
McCleskey's claim relates to the race of his victim, other claims
could apply with equally logical force to statistical disparities
that correlate with the race or sex of other actors in the criminal
justice system, such as defense attorneys, or judges. Also, there
is no logical reason that such a claim need be limited to racial or
sexual bias. If arbitrary and capricious punishment is the
touchstone under the Eighth Amendment, such a claim could-
at least in theory-be based upon any arbitrary variable, such
as the defendant's facial characteristics, or the physical
attractiveness of the defendant or the victim, that some
statistical study indicates may be influential in jury
decisionmaking. As these examples illustrate, there is no
limiting principle to the type of challenge brought by
McCleskey.87
Nevertheless, it was precisely because Justice Powell fully
recognized that McCleskey had effectively condemned the moral
legitimacy of our entire criminal justice system that he declared the
Court unable to grant McCleskey the remedy he sought:
The Constitution does not require that a State eliminate any
demonstrable disparity that correlates with a potentially
irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice system
that includes capital punishment. As we have stated specifically
in the context of capital punishment, the Constitution does not
"plac[e] totally unrealistic conditions on its use. '88
Whereas Justice Harlan had stressed the dangers of randomness,
Justice Powell was explicit in confessing the indestructibility of
racism-indeed he sustained the death penalty only by virtue of
making an apology of the widest possible magnitude. He apologized
for the entire criminal justice system, but asked for acceptance that
87. Id. at 314-19 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 319 (citations omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 n.50
(1976)).
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society cannot afford to choose perfect justice over law enforcement.
Then, remarkably, just three years later after leaving the Court,
Justice Powell explicitly confessed error for the McCleskey decision,
calling it one of two major decisions he regretted. In effect, Justice
Powell uttered an apology for his previous apologia.9 Apparently,
Justice Powell had come to believe that the unpredictability of capital
litigation might call for abolition. In 1990, he declared that he would
now, if in a legislature, vote against capital punishment and would
also vote the opposite way in the McCleskey case if given the
chance.90 Interestingly, Justice Powell stressed that it was, in effect,
the Harlan argument in McGautha that persuaded him.91 Upon
reflection, Powell found that the death penalty violated his sense of
the dignity and majesty of the law.'
Soon thereafter, Justice Blackmun, while still on the Court,
confessed error for his dissenting vote in Furman and his concurring
vote in Gregg. Justice Blackmun's confession of error essentially
repeated Justice Powell's explanation, but with an interesting
emphasis on his conception of the historical role of mercy-not just
equitable discretion-in the supposed balance that Gregg had claimed
to achieve. 93 It should be noted that Justice Blackmun dissented in
Brown, asserting, "The sentencer's ability to respond with mercy
towards a defendant has always struck me as a particularly valuable
aspect of the capital sentencing procedure," and that "the sentencer's
expression of mercy a distinctive feature of our society that we deeply
value. "9
Justice Blackmun wrote that more than twenty years after
Furman, the death penalty remained "fraught with arbitrariness,
discrimination, caprice, and mistake .... [T]he problems that were
pursued down one hole with procedural rules and verbal formulas
have come to the surface somewhere else, just as virulent and
pernicious as they were in their original form. ... "9
Recognizing that capital punishment must accommodate such
competing factors as systemic consistency and individual mercy, he
concluded:
89. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 450-53 (1994).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 451.
92. Id. at 451-52.
93. See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1127, 1128-38 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
94. California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 562-63 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. Callins, 510 U.S. at 1130.
2004] 1433
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
[T]his Court, in my view, has engaged in a futile effort to
balance these constitutional demands, and now is retreating not
only from the Furman promise of consistency and rationality,
but from the requirement of individualized sentencing as well.
Having virtually conceded that both fairness and rationality
cannot be achieved in the administration of the death penalty,
see McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court has chosen to deregulate the
entire enterprise, replacing, it would seem, substantive
constitutional requirements with mere aesthetics ....
From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the
machinery of death.... Rather than continue to coddle the
Court's delusion that the desired level of fairness has been
achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally
and intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death
penalty experiment has failed. It is virtually self evident to me
now that no combination of procedural rules or substantive
regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent
constitutional deficiencies .... 96
IV. AFTER MCCLESKEY: EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE MERCY
This Part stretches the definition of acts of pardon, mercy, and
apology to cover an affirmative act of death penalty legislation.
For two decades after Gregg, New York remained among the
holdout states that did not pass new death penalty laws. But its
commitment to abolishing capital punishment was weaker than the
tradition in states such as Massachusetts and Michigan, and
throughout the 1980s the New York State Assembly constantly tried
to reinstate it.97 It was largely one person, Governor Mario Cuomo,
who prevented reinstitution-he was the sole politician of major
national status to risk political penalty by opposing the death
penalty.98 Indeed, though he mysteriously refused to run for national
office, Cuomo may have been the only politician capable of getting
elected to national office despite his refusal to take the "oath" of
death penalty support.99 Throughout his three terms as Governor, he
discouraged and, when necessary, vetoed reinstatement legislation." °
But whatever the role of that opposition in state politics, George
96. Id. at 1129.
97. STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 276 (2002).
98. Id.
99. Weisberg, supra note 48, at 283.
100. See Franklin Zimring, The Wages of Ambivalence: On the Contexts and Prospects
of New York's Death Penalty, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 303,310, 316 (1996).
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Pataki defeated Cuomo in 1994, enabling a majority in the legislature
to enact a new death penalty law in 1995.11
But the oddity of the New York situation was evident in the
nature of the new law. Ultimately, the New York statute was a kind
of update of the Model Penal Code statute in light of the post-Gregg
Supreme Court refinement of the death penalty. As I have described
earlier, 10 2 New York's is a remarkable death penalty statute. It is, in
effect, an apologetic, merciful death penalty law.
The New York law had remarkable features. Rather than
stingily testing the limits of constitutional intervention in the death
penalty, like most state laws, the New York law explicitly built into its
statutory structure many of the constitutional "overrides" imposed on
the states in the previous decade. °3 Indeed, the statute even
anticipated and legislatively granted constitutional claims not yet
recognized, or ever likely to be recognized, by the courts.'0 It also
moved one step beyond the normal boundaries of a substantive death
penalty statute, with an elaborate scheme for death qualification for
jurors,105 incorporating a defendant-generous version of the death-
qualification rules established in Witherspoon v. Illinois"° and
Wainwright v. Witt. 7 In some bizarre statutory language, it offered a
kind of passive-aggressive reminder to the prosecution that it will
always have opportunities throughout a trial to revoke the capital
charge.'08 And, most strikingly, its rule exempting the mentally
retarded from the death penalty (anticipating by several years the
Supreme Court's ruling to that effect"° ) read less like an exception to
101. See Weisberg, supra note 48, at 283-84.
102. See generally id. (discussing the background of the New York statute, as well as
the various ways of reading the New York death penalty law).
103. Thus, for example, it built into the state scheme the broadest possible construction
of the Court's Lockett ruling and implemented many of the legal implications of the
Court's important decision in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981), virtually
equating the penalty phase of a capital case with a regular guilt phase trial. Thus, for
example, it required that both the presence of aggravating circumstances and the ultimate
dominance of aggravation over mitigation proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 400.27(3), 400.27(7)(b) (McKinney 2003).
104. The statute preempted the then-and still-unaccepted constitutional argument
that the state could not deem the absence of a statutorily enumerated mitigating
circumstance to be introduced as an aggravating circumstance. See N.Y. CRIM PROC.
LAW § 400.27(6).
105. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 270.16(1), 270.20(f).
106. 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968).
107. 469 U.S. 412,426-27 (1985).
108. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (1) ("[Nlothing in this section shall be deemed
to" preclude the People from withdrawing a capital charge).
109. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002).
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a death penalty law than an almost tenderly empathetic disability
rights statute.11° Thus, New York's was the first of what one might
call the "politically correct death penalty laws" of the post-Gregg era.
Almost a decade later, New York has not executed a single
person, and, given the tiny number of death sentences, combined with
elaborate state appellate review,"' there may not be any executions
for quite some time." 2 Of course, it is fanciful to impute any coherent
intention to a law passed by a modest majority, and reflecting,
presumably, an awkward conglomeration of legislative compromises.
Nevertheless, in terms of the neurotic dynamics of American death
penalty law, it is useful to view the New York law as a kind of apology
for the political decision to reinstate the formal death penalty law,
offering a kind of implicit pre-remission of death sentences by virtue
of the state taking on such self-imposed legal constraints as to ensure
that no defendant would die for a decade.
The Ryan mass commutation, while itself the most dramatic and
prolific act of executive clemency for the death penalty in our history,
is only part of the Illinois story. Closely tied to the pardon is the act
of the Illinois legislature, which resembles a fascinating echo or
aftershock of the pardon, and of the New York statute.
Whether motivated by, politically required by, or simply
sympathetic to, the Ryan commutation, the revisions in the Illinois
statute immediately following the pardon amount to a further
confession of error and apology. Some of the changes in the law are
careful fine-tunings of the legal protections against abuses of the
death penalty parallel to those in the New York statute. Thus, for
example, the new law removes from the scope of felony murder
aggravation mere participation in drug crimes." 3 Predictably, it also
addresses the "actual innocence" question by providing for broad
post-conviction access to DNA testing, 4 and in the face of the
Supreme Court's Herrera v. Collins decision,"' it waives any state
110. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27(12)(e) (2001).
111. See People v. Cahill, No. 123, slip. op. 18881 (N.Y. Nov. 25, 2003) (striking down
death sentence on grounds including faulty capital jury selection), available at 2003 WL
22770167; id. (Smith, J., concurring) (stating that the New York statute remains
constitutionally questionable for failure to prevent arbitrary and race-based outcomes).
112. For a prescient prediction, see generally Zimring, supra note 100 (arguing that
New York's death penalty is characterized by ambivalence and moral uncertainty which
has influenced both the shape of the law and the likelihood that it will be some time
before the state conducts another execution).
113. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (b)(6) (Supp. 2003).
114. Id. at 5/114-13(b).
115. 506 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1993) (providing that a claim of "actual innocence"
normally does not warrant federal habeas corpus relief where newly discovered evidence
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interest in the timely assertion of these and other issues, and it waives
virtually any constraints on the defendant's rights of discovery against
the prosecution." 6  In its version of exempting mentally retarded
persons from the death penalty, the Illinois statute goes even beyond
New York law in laying out an elaborate and generous setoff criteria
to determine retardation, along with a set of statutory invitations-
written with sledgehammer subtlety-for the parties to introduce the
evidence of retardation at any time during or even after the trial.n
But there is more to the Illinois statute. In an act of gratuitous
legislative symbolism, the new law adds the statutory mitigating
circumstances of "extreme emotional or physical abuse" and
"reduced mental capacity.""18 Note that in the wake of Lockett, it is
not necessary to add by statute any mitigating evidence that bears on
the defendant's character, record, or offense-the trial court would
have no power to refuse to admit evidence of these matters even
absent any statutory authorization. Indeed, it is not even clear that
the statutory provision would enhance the specificity of any jury
instruction on these matters. So what purpose does this provision
serve? Perhaps it is a public admonition to, and apology for, the past
omissions of capital defense lawyers. Or possibly it is an expressive
act, unconcerned with any legal effect.
The Illinois law mirrors the New York statute in the enactment
of a highly exquisite balancing test for the ultimate death decision.
Thus, whereas the statute had previously been at the restrictive end of
the continuum for guided discretion statutes ("there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death
sentence"" 9), it now declares that the jury may only impose death if
"after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation," it finds
that "death is the appropriate sentence."'2 ° The absurdly vague but
delicate word "appropriate" is itself a subtle invitation for
nullification. Finally, in perhaps the most remarkable substantive
provision of the new law, the appellate court itself is allowed to
vacate the death sentence if finds it to be "fundamentally unjust as
is offered outside state law deadline).
116. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-13(b).
117. Id. at 5/114-15, 5/122-2.2. Somewhat oddly the statute allows any party to raise the
issue. Most of the statute is a fairly mundane description of what any judge would have to
do anyway-a pretrial hearing, and the appointment of an expert. And the issue can be
raised at any time, pretrial or during the penalty phase, though if done at this later phase
the rules on appointment of experts change slightly, putting more burden on the defense.
118. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (c)(6), (7).
119. Id. at 5/9-1(h) (repealed 2003).
120. See id. at 5/9-1(g).
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applied to the particular case.., independent of any procedural
grounds for relief.""12 This invitation to judicial nullification, in effect,
turns Justice Harlan's original McGautha admonition on its head. 122
It enables appellate judges to grant mercy to otherwise properly
sentenced capital defendants because, in the view of the appellate
court, the technical and procedural rules by which they were
supposed to monitor capital sentencing could not capture the moral
concerns that society demands.
But the Illinois General Assembly has taken still more drastic
steps. Whereas the New York statute had only mildly stepped
outside the normal boundaries of death penalty legislation by tacking
on a jury qualification rule, the Illinois statute legislates huge changes
in the criminal procedure rules governing the Illinois police generally.
First, the statute takes the unique step of enacting unusual new
requirements for videotaping interrogations and other procedural
devices that were implicated in the supposedly wrongful
convictions. 123 In particular, it sets up a pilot program to test state-
wide videotaping of confessions by or interrogations of all first-degree
murder investigations. 124  That limitation to first degree murder is
interestingly ambiguous. It suggests that the legislature wanted to
make any new requirement for videotaping applicable only in death
penalty cases, but it had to speak in terms of first-degree murder
because it may not be clear at the interrogation stage whether the
state will ever bring a capital charge.'2- Whether this limitation
proves under- or over-inclusive will yet be seen, and so the legislature
may have only negligently adverted to the possibility that it was
reforming state criminal justice beyond the scope of the death
penalty.
On the other hand, the new law quite purposefully extends to all
criminal investigations, for all crimes, complex new regulation of line-
ups and restrictions on accusation by informant or uncorroborated
121. Id. at 5/9-1(i).
122. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
123. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3930/7.2.
124. Id. at 3930/7.2(9).
125. Generally, first-degree murder is any killing done without lawful justification, if
committed intentionally or with extreme recklessness towards human life, or in the act of
committing or attempting an independent "forcible felony". 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-
1(a). It can then be a capital murder if the state proves any of several specified
aggravating circumstances. Id. at 5/9-1(b). A killing meeting the definition of first degree
murder is reduced to second degree murder if the killer acted under a "sudden and intense
passion" or in response to "serious provocation by the person killed" or where the killer
sincerely but unreasonably believed the killing was legally justified. Id. at 5/9-2.
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eyewitness, 126 all going far beyond any constitutional requirements.1 27
The special statutory restrictions on the use of jailhouse informants-
even if they do not violate the Sixth Amendment128-- are essentially
apologies for the whole history of abuses by the Illinois police. And
the new law even includes new rules on the decertification of police
officers if they have engaged in perjurious behavior-this set of rules
designed for the middle-broad category of any "homicide"
investigation. In effect, it creates a civilian review board, replete with
a whole new administrative structure,2 9  itself essentially a
combination of a code of civil procedure, a civil service manual, and a
new substantive law of perjury, all attached to a death penalty law.
The Illinois statute marks the first time that death penalty
legislation has been the vehicle for such sweeping reforms in the legal
supervision of police conduct generally. In its efforts to cure the ills
of the system which Governor Ryan cited, 3° the legislation has, in
effect, done what Justice Powell half-did, in apologia, in the
McCleskey opinion, and then said he wished he could do, in full act of
judicial contrition, when he later expressed regret over that
decision-it apologizes for the past administration of criminal justice
in Illinois.
CONCLUSION
As this Essay has suggested, the relationship of mercy and justice
is complex and contested, and the Ryan commutation has provoked
some intriguing new questions about that relationship. Some might
view the commutation as an act of grace wholly outside the field of
justice. But Governor Ryan surely had some notion of justice in
mind-in effect, he thought the death sentences he was commuting
126. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107A-5.
127. Constitutional restrictions on line-ups are minimal. Wade v. United States imposes
a Sixth Amendment right of counsel-but only in the rare cases where the subject of a
line-up has already been formally charged with the crime. 388 U.S. 218, 237 (1967).
Otherwise, line-ups are subject to only vague and fact-specific due process standards to
prevent "impermissibly suggestive" line-ups. See Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 109-
14. (1977).
128. The only constitutional restrictions on the use of prosecution informants are a
vague balancing test for disclosure of informant identities at trial (rarely an issue in capital
cases), see Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957), and Sixth Amendment
restrictions on testimony from informants who were acting as police agents when they
encountered the accused and who "deliberately elicited" inculpatory statements from
them, see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274-75 (1980).
129. 50 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/6.1.
130. See Governor George Ryan, Speech at the Northwestern University School of
Law (Jan. 11, 2003) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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had been unjust, if not technically illegal. Critics of his action might
therefore view his act of mercy as violating justice by invoking the
wrong legal principles or exercising unwarranted legal authority.
But the commutation might also be viewed as a very distinct type
of mercy, though one with a certain pedigree in American death
penalty law. That is, it can be seen as an apology for systemic
injustice, and in that regard it bears an interesting relationship to the
legislation it produced. That legislation is itself an act of prospective
mercy in the sense that it will probably spare from the death penalty
defendants who would otherwise receive it and, under the older law,
deserve it. All legislation changes law, but in the wake of the
commutations, this new legislation means not just to change the law
but to confess error in entire legal system. On the other hand, by
taking the approach of reforming, without ending, the death penalty,
the legislature's act of mercy might end up ensuring that future deaths
sentences and executions will be immune to claims of individual
mercy, because the legal system will have assimilated its merciful
sense of justice into its own mechanisms. Whether this will happen
and whether it would be a good thing are as contestable as the
question with which this Essay began: What does mercy do?
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